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ABSTRACT 
 
Researchers in the area of information security have mainly been concerned with tools, 
techniques and policies that firms can use to protect themselves against security breaches. 
However, information security is as much about security software as it is about secure software.  
Software is not secure when it has defects or flaws which can be exploited by hackers to cause 
attacks such as unauthorized intrusion or denial of service attacks. Any public announcement about 
a software defect is termed as ‘vulnerability disclosure’. 
Although research in software economics have studied firms’ incentive to improve overall 
quality, there have been no studies to show that software vendors have an incentive to invest in 
building more secure software. In this paper, we use the event study methodology to examine the 
role that financial markets play in determining software vendors’ incentives to build more secure 
software. We collect data from leading national newspapers and industry sources like CERT by 
searching for reports on published software vulnerabilities. We show that vulnerability disclosures 
lead to a negative and significant change in market value for a software vendor. On average, a 
vendor loses around 0.6% value in stock price when a vulnerability is reported. This is equivalent 
to a loss in market capitalization values of $0.86 billion per vulnerability announcement. To 
provide further insight, we use the information content of the disclosure announcement to classify 
vulnerabilities into various types. We find that the change in stock price is more negative if the 
vendor fails to provide a patch at the time of disclosure. Moreover, vulnerabilities which cause a 
confidentiality related breach cause a greater decline in the market value for a vendor than the 
vulnerabilities which cause non-confidentiality related breaches.  Also, more severe flaws have a 
significantly greater impact than flaws with low or moderate severity. Finally, we find that the 
markets do not punish a software vendor more severely if a third party discovers a flaw in its 
product than if the vendor itself discovers the flaw. Our analysis provides many interesting 
implications for software vendors as well as policy makers. 
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1. Introduction  
Many believe that software vendors typically follow the policy of ‘sell today and fix it 
tomorrow’; or ‘I’d rather have it wrong than have it late’ (Paulk et al 1994; Arora, 
Caulkins, Telang 2004) for launching software products in the market. This policy, 
dictated by the need to launch products quickly before competitors, seemed to work in the 
past because software errors which escape detection during pre-launch testing appear very 
infrequently in normal operations (once every ‘5000’ years, as per Adams, 1980). 
However, Adams’ ‘5000-year error’ theory might not hold in the internet age because 
hundreds (if not thousands) of people are looking for flaws in other vendors software 
products, drastically increasing the chances that a flaw will be exposed. Various people 
such as hackers, independent security firms and academic researchers are interested in 
finding flaws in other vendors’ software for different reasons. Not only are security 
software products such as firewalls at risk, but software like operating systems, enterprise 
software and database software also contain flaws which can be exploited to create security 
related attacks.  
The Organization of Internet Safety (OIS) (www.oisafety.org) defines security 
vulnerability as2: “security vulnerability is a flaw within a software system that can cause it 
to work contrary to its documented design and could be exploited to cause the system to 
violate its documented security policy”. Software vulnerabilities have widespread impact 
and can potentially cause billions of dollars in downtime and disruptions to firms (In this 
paper, the word ‘firms’ refers to companies which use software products; ‘vendors’ refers 
to companies which develop the software products). A study by NIST in 2002 estimates 
the cost of faulty software at $60 bn per year. Incidents like the Code Red virus (in 2001) 
and the Melissa virus (in 1999) occurred when hackers exploited flaws in software. The 
damage due to Code Red was estimated at $2.1 bn and due to Melissa at $1.1bn3. The 
Gartner Group estimates that the system downtime caused by security vulnerabilities 
would triple from 5% of the total downtime in 2004 to 15% of the total downtime in 2008.4 
In 2003, Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) reported around 250,000 self 
                                                 
2 In this paper, we use the terms ‘software vulnerability’, ‘security vulnerability’, ‘bug’, ‘flaw’ 
interchangeably. Any other type of vulnerability such as a non-security related vulnerability explicit 
mentioned by name. 
3 Source : www.cisco.com/warp/public/cc/so/neso/sqso/roi1_wp.pdf 
4 http://www.tekrati.com/T2/Analyst_Research/ResearchAnnouncementsDetails.asp?Newsid=3608  
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reported incidences of system breaches, most of which exploit vulnerabilities in software 
code (Applewhite 2004). Microsoft’s $200m campaign for .NET was marred by the 
discovery of a security flaw in Visual C++ .NET barely a month after Microsoft Chairman 
Bill Gates directed employees to focus on building more secure software (dubbed the 
‘Trustworthy Computing’ initiative). Moreover, vulnerability disclosure is finding its way 
into firms’ strategy toolkits as it evident from a WSJ report in Feb 2004 that software 
vendors are spending time and effort in discovering flaws in their rivals’ software products 
in order to influence the rivals’ stock prices. For example, security software vendor IDS 
released a vulnerability alert on rival Checkpoint’s firewall software on the day Checkpoint 
usually holds its annual US investor conference. Some examples of vulnerability 
announcements reported in popular press are: 
• News.com(04/25/2000) “A computer security firm has discovered a serious 
vulnerability in Red Hat’s newest version of Linux that could let attackers destroy or 
deface a Web site  - or possibly even take over the machine itself……..” 
• WSJ(02/11/2004) “Microsoft Corp. warned customers about serious security problems 
with its Windows software that let hackers quietly break into their computers to steal 
files, delete data or eavesdrop on sensitive information……..” 
Inspite of all these concerns about software vulnerabilities, not much has been 
mentioned in literature about the incentive of software vendors to invest in defect-free 
software. Literature on software risks fails to include any measure for security related risks 
(Wallace, Keil and Rai, 2004; Barki, Rivard and Talbot, 1993). The closest literature to the 
topic of security vulnerabilities is that on software quality (Basili and Musa, 1991; Harter, 
Krishnan and Slaughter, 2000). However, in traditional literature, quality is measured in 
terms of reliability and integrity of the source code – which essentially tests software 
against specified streams of input from users. However, in today’s internet age, software 
designers must not only think of users, but also malicious adversaries (Devanbu and 
Stubblebine, 2000). Some quality models such as ISO9126 fail to include computer 
security (Pfleegar 1997). Therefore software which has been certified as high quality, 
based on existing definitions of software quality, can have many security flaws. 
Researchers in computer science are working on better integration of the two disciplines of 
 3
software quality and software security while designing software (Carr, Tynan and Davis 
1991, Wang and Wang, 2003; McGraw 2004).  
So far, there has only been anecdotal evidence that software vulnerabilities are causing 
vendors to lose market value. For example, the Wall Street Journal (11/09/2004) reported 
that Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (IE) is losing market share in the web browser market to 
competitors like Mozilla’s Firefox, due to numerous flaws discovered in IE. For example, 
nearly 8 million people have downloaded the Firefox browser between September-
November 2004. While the damage that firms suffer as a result of security breaches can be 
measured in terms of downtime and maintenance activity, the cost implication of 
vulnerability disclosures on the software vendors is neither clear nor well studied.  This is 
the major goal of this paper. Using an event study methodology, we estimate how the stock 
price of the software vendors is affected when vulnerability information in their products is 
published in popular press.  
Prior literature on product defects (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985) predicts that product 
recall announcements in drug and auto industries are associated with loss in market value 
of a firm. Davidson and Worrell (1992) confirm the negative impact of product defects on 
stock prices in non-auto industries and also analyze the impact of different types of recall 
(e.g. total product recall versus a recall for repair; government ordered recall versus 
voluntary recall). However the results of these prior studies on product defects cannot be 
directly applied to the software industry because of the following characteristics of 
software products: One, software products generally come with a click-wrap agreement (or 
EULA – End User License Agreement) which limits the vendors’ liability. Two, the 
general philosophy held by software vendors, software customers and the US courts is that 
software is a uniquely complex product that will probably have some defects (Cusumano 
2004). Therefore it is not clear whether markets will react adversely to the news of a 
software vulnerability; because over the long run, markets will anticipate the effect of a 
vulnerability announcements on cash flows of software vendors, so the impact of a specific 
announcement might not be significant. Three, software vulnerability announcements are 
generally accompanied with a remedial patch which potentially protects customers from 
malicious exploits. Hence, the market may not behave adversely towards a vendor if it 
releases a patch along-with the vulnerability announcement.  Finally, vulnerability 
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announcements are directly related to the installed base of a software product. Popular 
software like those from Microsoft are constantly subject to malicious and non-malicious 
attacks and as such have a greater proportion of flaws reported in them as compared to 
software by Apple, where the user base is comparatively smaller. Therefore, the presence 
of vulnerabilities may not always signal a lower quality product; it may in-fact signal 
superiority over competition. E.g. John Thomson, CEO of Symantec, predicts that the 
flaws in Linux will likely increase as the installed base increases. In view of these 
arguments, it would be interesting to understand whether and how the market responds to 
vulnerability disclosures in software products. 
Motivated by these observations, in this research we try to quantify the losses that 
software vendors bear when a vulnerability is disclosed in their product. The main 
questions that we seek to answer are: 
1. What is the impact of vulnerability disclosures on the market value of a software 
vendor? 
2. How do the characteristics of the vulnerability impact this change in market value? 
Our research has important policy implications in terms of understanding vendors’ 
incentive to improve pre- and post-launch quality of their software products.  While there 
is lot of hype surrounding the poor quality dished out by software vendors, their incentives 
to provide more secure software is still unclear. If we indeed find that the market is willing 
to punish vulnerability announcements because it perceives these announcements as a 
signal of poor quality software which either increase vendor costs to fix them or erode their 
market share in the long run, then our research provides a direct evidence of incentives to 
provide more secure software. Vulnerabilities are disclosed by vendors or by third 
party/competitors with or without a patch. Since we measure if there are significant 
differences in market reaction to such disclosures, our paper provides policy guidelines to 
vendors about whether and how they may disclose the information themselves. Moreover, 
this also provides evidence on what is the value of patches when vulnerabilities are 
disclosed. Finally, we also examine how vulnerability characteristics, effect of 9/11 etc 
affect the market reaction.  
Using an event-study approach, we collect data on about 146 vulnerability disclosure 
announcements over the period of over 5 years for 18 publicly traded vendors. Our results 
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confirm that vulnerability disclosure adversely and significantly affects the stock 
performance of a software vendor. We show that, on average, a software vendor loses 
around 0.63% of market value on the day of the vulnerability announcement. This 
translates to a dollar amount of $0.86 bn loss in market value. We also find that 
vulnerabilities where the vendor fails to provide a patch at the time of disclosure yield 
more negative returns than when the vendor discloses a patch. On average, a vendor loses 
0.8% more in market value when a patch is not available. This provides evidence as to why 
vendors are trying to push for legalizing the limited disclosure norms. We also show that 
vulnerabilities which create confidentiality related breaches result in a greater loss than 
vulnerabilities which create non-confidentiality related breaches. For example, vendors 
lose 0.75% less in market value when the vulnerability can lead to a non-confidentiality 
related breach than when it can lead to a confidentiality related breach. We also find that 
more severe software vulnerabilities result in a greater loss in market value than less severe 
vulnerabilities.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, section 2, we provide 
a literature review. We develop our hypotheses in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the 
methodology of data collection and also describe the event study methodology. In Section 
5, we present our results using multivariate regression analysis and test various hypothesis 
related to how the vulnerability characteristics effect the change in stock prices. Finally, 
we present the concluding remarks in Section 6. 
2. Literature Review 
Most prior research on information security discusses the economics of such 
investments from a customer perspective, rather than from a software vendor perspective 
(Anderson 2001). Gordon and Loeb (2002) show that firms should make investments in 
information security far less than the expected loss from a security breach. Gordon et al 
(2002), Gal-Or and Ghose (2003) discuss the economics of information sharing among 
firms on security related issues. Prior event study analyses on information security have 
focused on the change in market value of firms whose systems are breached (Cavusoglu et 
al (2004) and Kannan, Rees and Sridhar (2004)). These studies show that announcements 
of a security breach negatively impact the CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) of firms 
whose information systems have been breached. Campbell et al (2003) conduct a similar 
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event study and find that only the impact of confidentiality related security breaches is 
negative and significant; the impact of non-confidentiality related security breaches is not 
significantly different from zero.  Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) show similar results by 
finding that Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks are not associated with any significant 
loss in value for firms5.  
Disclosure of vulnerabilities has been one contentious area. Typically, a major portion 
of the vulnerabilities is reported by benign independent security analysts (ISA). Since no 
legal guidelines exists which dictate how vulnerabilities should be handled by the 
discoverer,  some ISAs report the vulnerability to the vendor and give it sufficient time to 
come up with a patch (The OIS recommends a time period of 30 days to be given to 
vendors to come up with a patch). However, some other ISAs follow the policy of full 
disclosure, i.e. they immediately post the vulnerability to a public listing like Bugtraq. One 
major goal of full disclosure is to eventually force vendors to come up with more secure 
software. The debate on disclosure policies can be summarized by the following quotes 
(Applewhite 2000): Jennifer Granick of Stanford University defends full disclosure as 
“You want a free flow of information, just like in other scientific fields, ideally without 
betraying important interests.” Scott Blake of OIS opposes full disclosure as, “As soon as 
you tell one person, you have tipped the balance and people will begin producing 
exploits.” Some recent academic work is examining this issue more formally. Arora, 
Telang and Xu (2004) study the optimal timing of vulnerability disclosure and show how 
disclosure can force vendors to release patches quickly. Kannan and Telang (2004) explore 
the welfare implications of a market mechanism for software vulnerabilities and report that 
a market based mechanism for software vulnerabilities always underperforms a CERT-type 
mechanism.  
However none of these studies measures the impact of disclosure on vendor’s market 
value or profitability. While one major goal of full disclosure is to eventually force vendors 
to develop secure software, empirically, there is no evidence that suggests that disclosure 
indeed creates such incentives. Our paper provides an understanding of whether such 
disclosures create incentives for the vendors to produce secure software in the first place.  
                                                 
5 DoS attacks are classified as non-confidential in the Campbell et al (2001) study. 
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Our methodology follows closely from prior event study analysis. Campbell et al 
(1997) present a useful summary of the event study analysis highlighting the history as 
well as the commonly followed methodologies. Event study methodologies are well 
accepted for studying the implications of public announcements on stock prices. Hendricks 
and Singhal (1996) study the impact of quality award winning announcements on the 
market value of firms and observe positive abnormal returns generated by winning a 
quality award. They further note that awards given by independent organizations and 
announcements by small firms are more likely to have a significant impact on the firms’ 
market value. In the field of Information Systems, Subramani and Walden (2001) used 
event study analyses to show that e-commerce announcements lead to significant increases 
in the stock price of firms. Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud (2001) examine the influence 
of newly announced CIO positions on shareholder wealth. Im, Dow and Grover (2001) 
examine the changes in market value of a firm in response to IT investment 
announcements. Bharadwaj and Keil (2003) investigate the impact of IT failures on firms’ 
market value. 
The main contribution of this research is that this is one of the first comprehensive 
studies, to our knowledge, that has tried to measure the impact of vulnerabilities on 
software vendors. Thus, we extend prior literature on product defects and confirm that 
software vendors too suffer a loss in market value when a flaw is discovered in their 
product. This is inspite of the fact that software vulnerabilities are prevalent among 
software of almost all major vendors and that vendors face no legal liability if clients suffer 
losses due to the software flaw. As we noted in the introduction that this has important 
implications in terms of vendors making investment in software quality as well as policy 
and legal issues which govern vulnerability disclosures.  
3. Hypotheses  
Much of the prior literature on product defects (Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), Davidson 
and Worrell (1992)) shows that generally defective product and recall announcements are 
associated with loss in market value of a firm. Banker and Slaughter (1998) find that 
unplanned and critical maintenance activities increase software maintenance costs.  Thus, 
fixing bugs entails cost to firms. For example, the security fixes may cost about $2000-
$9000 when done during testing phase. However, they may cost more than 4-8 times when 
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fixed after the application has been shipped.6 Slaughter et al (1998) and Westland (2003) 
suggest that software defects are harder and costlier to fix if discovered later in the 
software development cycle (e.g. when the product has been shipped to the customer). 
Moreover, security breach announcements by the user organizations have been known to 
have a negative impact on the share value for firms. Cavusoglu et al (2004) show that the 
market capitalization values of firms decreases, on average, by $2.1 billion within two 
days of a security breach. Cyber insurance firm J.S. Wurzler charges an additional 
premium to firms for using Windows NT due to the number of security breaches in the 
software (Gordon, Loeb and Sohail, 2003). Clearly, poor security costs the users of the 
software.  Thus, the cost to the vendor can be written as  
Cost of vulnerability disclosure to vendor = Cost of patching the vulnerability + λ * (Cost 
to the users of the software due to exploitation, and/or cost to patch the system) 
Here, λ is the internalization factor. That is the user loss that is internalized by the 
vendor due to lost sale or reputation loss (or liability if imposed in future). Clearly, λ 
depends on how willing users are to “punish” the vendor, how competitive the market is 
and the characteristics of vulnerability (Arora, Telang and Xu 2004). For example, this is a 
typical customer reaction. 
"We are extremely concerned by the high amount of vulnerabilities and patches from 
Microsoft. This goes against the credibility of what they have been saying," 
Michael Kamens, global security director at Thermo Electron Corp.7
Given the fact the competitors seem to be using vulnerability disclosure as a strategic way 
to undermine the rivals’ reputations, it seems that vulnerability disclosure signals a 
potential loss in future cash flows for a software vendor owing to customer dissatisfaction 
because customers suffer a loss if their systems get breached. It also signals an increase in 
product related costs due to the time and effort that the vendor spends in developing a 
patch or a fix for the flaw. Therefore, we hypothesize that  
H1: A software vendor suffers a loss in market value when a security related vulnerability 
is announced in its products. 
                                                 
6 http://www.sbq.com/sbq/rosi/sbq_rosi_software_engineering.pdf 
7 http://www.computerworld.com/softwaretopics/os/windows/story/0,10801,92349,00.html 
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Our second hypothesis pertains to whether the software vendor releases a patch for the 
product at the time of the vulnerability announcement.  As per the popular convention 
followed in the vulnerabilities market, vendors are given some time to work on a patch for 
the vulnerability before it is made public. Vendors may also provide a workaround (such as 
disabling features of the software) when a vulnerability is disclosed and choose to address 
the vulnerability in a future upgrade. Presence of the patch is also likely to reduce 
customers’ loss if they apply the patch. Since presence of patch also reflects vendor’s 
commitment to its customers we expect that vulnerabilities disclosed with a patch will 
compensate, to an extent, the negative signal due to vulnerability disclosure. Vendors are 
also pushing for limited disclosures so that they can release the remedial patch in time. 
This also suggests that patches play a critical role. Therefore our second hypothesis is: 
H2: CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) [negative] of a stock is greater for vulnerabilities 
where the software vendor does not release a patch at the time of the vulnerability 
disclosure. 
The damages suffered by a software vendor’s customers due to a vulnerability in the 
vendor’s software depend on the type of security breach that the vulnerability facilitates. 
Campbell et at (2003) classify the security breaches as confidentiality related and non-
confidentiality related. Confidentiality related breaches involve attacks where an intruder 
can gain access into a system and can steal sensitive information. Non-confidentiality 
related breaches include attacks like denial of service (DoS) attacks where the most likely 
scenario is a disruption and/or a downtime. Campbell et al (2003) further show that the 
loss in market value is more for confidentiality related breaches than for non-
confidentiality related breaches. Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) show that DoS attacks are not 
associated with any significant loss in market value for a firm. Therefore we would expect 
that the vendor loses more market value if the vulnerability in its software causes a 
confidentiality related breach. The intuition is that the negative reaction due to the 
vulnerability is more if the customers can potentially suffer greater losses due to the 
vulnerability. Therefore, our next hypothesis is:  
H3: CAR is greater for a vulnerability which can potentially cause a breach in 
confidentiality as compared to non-confidentiality related breaches. 
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 The impact of a software flaw on a vendor also depends on how severe the 
vulnerability is. Davidson and Worrell (1992) conduct an event study with product defect 
announcements in the tire industry and showed that the impact of severe flaws (which 
involve a recall) is more than that of less severe flaws (which involve repairs but nor 
recall). Sometimes an ‘exploit’ exists for the vulnerability at the time of announcement. An 
‘exploit’ is a piece of code which anyone can use to compromise the security of the 
software product and subsequently of other information assets. Therefore, we propose our 
next set of hypotheses as: 
H4a: The loss in market value of a software vendor is greater if the announced 
vulnerability has a higher severity.  
H4b: The loss in market value of a software vendor is greater if an exploit exists publicly 
at the time of the vulnerability announcement. 
A recent article in the Wall Street Journal hinted that firms are using vulnerability 
disclosure as a strategic weapon against competitors. E.g. ISS disclosed a vulnerability in 
rival Checkpoint’s flagship firewall product just ahead of Checkpoint’s investor summit. 
Vendors themselves disclose vulnerability information in their products routinely. In fact, 
many believe that vendors would prefer not to disclose information at all but they fear that 
someone else would do it. Generally vendors are likely to be more careful about the 
disclosure as opposed to third party. Moreover, disclosure by vendors would signal their 
commitment to providing secure software, we hypothesize that  
H5: The loss in market value for a software vendor is lower in case the security 
vulnerability is discovered by the vendor itself rather than by rivals or third party security 
firms. 
Our final hypothesis relates to the publication where vulnerability is reported. Some 
vulnerabilities are reported in popular press. Others find mention only in industry sources 
like CERT or technology news portals like news.com. The question which arises is 
whether both sources are equally influential in affecting a stock’s CAR? One would 
suspect the popular press of being more influential than industry sources because it reaches 
a broader audience. So our next hypothesis is: 
H6: The magnitude of CAR is more when the vulnerability is reported in popular press 
than in industry sources. 
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4. Data Description & Methodology 
4.1 Vulnerability Disclosure Process 
The typical process of vulnerability disclosure takes place as shown in Figure 1.  
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 Figure 1: Vulnerability Discovery and Disclosure 
 
The process starts with the vulnerability discovery. There are various sources for 
vulnerability discovery. Some vulnerabilities are discovered by amateur researchers or by 
independent security analysts (ISA) like eEye Security.  If the ISA chooses to follow 
‘limited disclosure’, it reports the vulnerability to the concerned vendor or to an 
independent body like CERT who disclose the vulnerability to public later (generally after 
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the fix has been made available) in a limited way8.  Sometimes, the vendor itself might 
discover a vulnerability in its products. On the other hand, if the ISA chooses to follow 
‘full disclosure’ or if a hacker discovers the vulnerability, the vulnerability may get 
announced directly to public. Forums such as Bugtraq allow for full disclosure of 
vulnerability information. In any case, after the vulnerability has been announced, 
investors might re-evaluate their projections on the software vendors’ profitability based 
on the vulnerability characteristics. Consequentially, the stock price of the vendor might 
show an abnormal return due to the vulnerability announcement. 
4.2 Data 
Our data comes from the vulnerability disclosures in popular press as well as from the 
advisory reports in CERT. We include articles published by news networks like 
Businesswire, Newswire and daily articles in popular press like WSJ, NY Times, 
Washington Post and LA Times. We search for these news articles in Proquest and Lexis-
Nexis Academic databases which, between them, maintain news articles from major 
newspapers and news networks all over the country. We also include articles from 
news.com which is a CNET owned site and is a premier source for round-the-clock, 
breaking technology news coverage. We used the following terms in our search: 
‘vulnerability AND disclosure’, ‘software AND vulnerability’, ‘software AND flaw’, 
‘virus AND vulnerability’& ‘vulnerability AND patch’.  
We also searched the vulnerability announcements for information on the type of 
vulnerabilities. Based on this, we classify vulnerabilities into various categories.  
• If the announcements contained words such as ‘serious’ or ‘severe’ or ‘dangerous’ to 
describe the vulnerability, we characterized the vulnerability as ‘Severe’. If the 
announcement characterized the vulnerability as ‘moderately severe’ or ‘with low 
severity’, we characterized it as ‘Non-severe’.  
• The vulnerability announcements also had references to what kind to security breach 
could be facilitated if attackers exploited the vulnerability. If the vulnerability contained 
terms such as ‘cause denial of service’,  or ‘disrupt operations’, we classified the 
vulnerability as type ‘DoS’; otherwise if the vulnerability contained terms such as ‘gain 
                                                 
8 CERT then reports the vulnerability to the respective vendor and gives it time (typically 45 days) to come 
out with a patch. 
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access’ or ‘steal information’ or ‘take control’, we classified the vulnerability as 
‘Confidentiality Related’.   
• Further, the announcements also described whether the vendor released a patch at the 
time of the vulnerability announcement. If the vendor announced a patch at the time of 
vulnerability disclosure, we classified the vulnerability as ‘Fix Available’.  
• Finally, we also classify vulnerabilities on whether an ‘exploit’ exists for the 
vulnerability in the public domain. If the vulnerability announcement contained terms 
such as ‘an exploit for the vulnerability is circulating’, we classify the vulnerability as 
type ‘Exploit’. 
As per convention in prior event study literature (Hendricks & Singhal 1996), we excluded 
the following type of announcements from our sample: 
• Vulnerability announcements in non-daily periodicals like magazines because of the 
difficulty in determining the exact date of the announcement. 
• Repeat announcements of the same event in a different publication at a later date. In 
case of such repeat announcements, the earliest announcement date was chosen as the 
event day.  
• Announcements which were associated with other confounding events like stock splits 
and mergers on the event date. 
• Announcements related to firms not traded on any public exchange in the US. 
• Announcements that point to a fundamental protocol flaw rather than a particular 
software. E.g. a flaw in the FTP protocol affects multiple vendors. The reason behind 
dropping this category is that the flaw exists in the software only because it follows a 
flawed protocol, and not due to the vendor.   
• Software flaws which are not security related.  
Our dataset contains 146 vulnerability announcements pertaining to around 18 firms in 
the time period January 1999 – May 2004. We capture information on the following details 
about the vulnerability announcement: date, firm name, product, who discovered the flaw, 
news source, whether patch is available and severity. The descriptive statistics of the data 
are given in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Number of firms 18 
Number of announcements 146 
%age of vulnerabilities announcements in popular press 35 
%age of vulnerabilities for which vendor has patch available at the 
time of the announcement. 
24 
%age of vulnerabilities discovered by the vendor itself 36 
% of vulnerabilities that could potentially result in a security breach 
related to confidentiality 
39 
%age of vulnerabilities for which the announcement contained 
information of a publicly available ‘exploit’ 
22 
 
The year-wise distribution of announcements is given in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 
Year Number of Announcements 
1999 4 
2000 22 
2001 28 
2002 24 
2003 45 
2004 (till May 30) 23 
 
4.3 Methodology  
We use the standard event study methodology for this analysis. An event study assumes 
that returns on a stock are significantly impacted by an event of interest (in our case, the 
event of interest is the vulnerability disclosure announcement).  The period of interest for 
which we observe the event is known as the event window. The smallest event window is 
one day (day of the announcement or day ‘0’9). In practice, the event window is often 
expanded to include two days (day 0 and day 110) to capture the effect of price 
announcements made after the close of the markets on a particular day. Sometimes 
                                                 
9 If an announcement is made on a day when the markets are closed, we consider the next day when the 
markets open as day 0.
10 Day 1 is the day after the announcement. 
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researchers include a day before the announcements to incorporate any information leaks 
about the event. In our study we define a one day event window (day 0)11. Hendricks and 
Singhal (1996) cite two reasons to use a one day event period. One, a shorter event period 
permits a better estimation of the effects of information of stock prices since it reduces the 
possibility of other confounding factors not related to the announcement. Two, it also 
increases the power of the statistical tests.  
Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between the actual return of the stock 
over the event window minus the expected return of the stock over the event window. The 
expected return on the stock is calculated in several ways, but in our analysis, we use the 
market model which assumes a stable linear relation between the market return and the 
return on the stock. We also verify our results using other methods such as the market-
adjusted method and the mean-adjusted method. The coefficients of the linear model are 
calculated by choosing a portion of the data as the estimation window. The estimation 
window, generally between 120 days and 200 days used in most studies, is the period 
immediately before the event window. In our case, we use an estimation window of size 
160 days, from day -175 to day -16. 
There are three main methods followed in the event study methodology (Campbell, 
Andrew and MacKinlay, 1997; Hendricks and Singhal, 1996) to estimate the abnormal 
returns.  
1. The Market Model  
In the market model, the abnormal returns are estimated as follows: 
mtititit RRAR ⋅−−= βα  12    (1) 
where i denotes the event (i=1,2……N), m denotes the market and t denotes the  day of 
the event (e.g t = 0 denotes the day of the vulnerability announcement.). ARit denotes the 
abnormal return of event i at time t, Rit denotes the actual return and Rmt denotes the market 
return at time period t13.   mtit R⋅+ βα  denotes the normal return of the firm due to the 
market-wide movement. The abnormal return is defined as the difference between the 
actual return and the normal return. This is the part of the actual return that cannot be 
                                                 
11 We also highlight our results using different values of the event window. 
12 Rit for a stock is the percent change in the stock price at time t, (=Pit - Pit-1 )/ Pit-1     
13 We obtain the data on the stock and market returns from Yahoo Finance(http://finance.yahoo.com) 
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explained by market movements and captures the effect of the event. Since most of the 
tech stocks are listed on NASDAQ, we use this as our indicator for market returns. We use 
ordinary least squares regression to estimate the coefficients α and β for the above 
regression. 
2. The Market Adjusted Model 
In this case, the abnormal returns are given as 
mtitit RRAR −=         (2) 
where the terms have the usual meaning as in the Market Model. 
3. The Mean Adjusted Model 
iitit RRAR −=          (3) 
where ∑
=
=
T
s
isi RR
1
is the mean return on the stock which made a vulnerability 
announcement during event i,  over the duration of the estimation period and T is number 
of days in the estimation period (in our study, T=160). 
The mean abnormal return across all observations on day t of the event is given as 
∑
=
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. The cumulative abnormal return ∑=
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tACAR  for the event is defined as the 
sum of the abnormal returns over the event window. Prior research on event studies 
(Brown & Warner 1980, Brown & Warner 1985) presents a comprehensive analysis of 
suitable test statistics for the abnormal mean return.  Since vulnerabilities were disclosed 
by more than one vendor on a given day, our statistic should allow for event day 
clustering. The following t-statistic proposed by Brown & Warner (1985) takes in to 
account event day clustering as well as cross-sectional dependence in the security specific 
excess returns. 
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The null hypothesis is that the abnormal returns are not significantly different from 
zero. Under the null hypothesis, the abnormal returns are independent and identically 
distributed and normal with a mean of zero and the variance given by the variance of 
abnormal returns over the estimation period. 
We also do multivariate regression and test our hypothesis of how CAR varies with 
various vendors, or vulnerability characteristics. But before we present the details on our 
regression analysis, we present the results of the event study. 
4.2 Event Study Results 
Table 3 summarizes the results of our event study and quantifies the effect of 
vulnerability disclosures on the stock prices of software vendors for our entire sample of 
146 announcements (p-values are in parenthesis) 
Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Day 0     CAR Market Model Market 
Adjusted Model 
Mean Model 
Mean Abnormal Return  -0.63   (0.01) -0.67   (0.01) -0.5    (0.09) 
Median Abnormal Return  -0.44  (0.00) -0.5    (0.00) -0.55  (0.01) 
Percent Less than Zero 64%   (0.00) 63.5%  (0.001) 58.7%  (0.03)
 
We calculate CARs under there different models (Market Model, Market Adjusted 
Model and Mean Adjusted Model).  For each of the three models, we use three different 
test statistics (Mean Abnormal Return, Median Abnormal Return and Percent Less than 
Zero). The Mean Abnormal Return Test (equations (1) to (4)) is parametric in nature and 
makes assumptions about the distribution of abnormal returns. We also use two non-
parametric tests to strengthen our results. One, we use the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test to 
calculate the p-value for the median abnormal return; two we use the Sign Test to calculate 
the p-value for the percent negative returns. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test tests whether 
the median of the abnormal returns is different than zero. The Sign Test is based on the 
sign rather than the magnitude of the abnormal returns and requires that under the null 
hypothesis, the proportion of abnormal returns greater than (or less than) zero is 50%.  
From Table 3, we note that the CAR for day 0 is negative across all the three different 
models. E.g. the Mean Abnormal Return varies between 0.5% - 0.67% depending on the 
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model used. Further the Market Model and the Market Adjusted Model are statistically 
significant at p < 0.01, while the Mean Adjusted Model is statistically significant at p < 0.1 
level.  The Median Abnormal Returns range between 0.44% - 0.55% and are significant at 
the 0.01 level. Finally, the percent observations less than zero range between 57.8% - 64% 
and are significant at the 0.05 level. It is clear that CAR is negative and statistically 
significant for all three models and all three tests.  
Thus, our results suggest that software vendors do tend to lose market value when a 
vulnerability is announced in their product. To check for the robustness of our results, we 
not only test the mean abnormal returns, but also the median abnormal returns and the 
percent less than zero. This provides support for hypothesis H1 that vulnerability 
announcements are associated with a loss in market value of software vendors.  
We also calculate the abnormal returns using different event windows (beyond 0 days) 
using the market model (the results do not change substantially for other models). The 
results are given in Table 4.  
Table 4: CAR for various time periods 
Day -1 0 0 to 1 0 to 2 0 to 5 
 
0 to 10 
CAR 
(p-value) 
0.25 
(0.4) 
-0.63 
(0.01) 
-0.65 
(0.07) 
-0.47 
(0.35) 
-0.25 
(0.7) 
-0.8 
(0.36) 
 
From the table, it is clear that the CAR on day 0 is negative and significant at the 0.01 
evel. However, CAR for day 0 and day 1 combined is significant only at the 0.1 level. This 
suggests that the stock market is efficient in the sense that the effect of a software 
vulnerability announcement is quickly incorporated into a vendors’ stock price. The p-
values for day -1 is not statistically significant. A possible explanation for this is that the 
effect of news leakage through forums like SecurityFocus is not significant. The CARs in 
columns 3, 4, 5 and 6 are negative but not statistically significant. However, it is 
interesting to note that the CARs are negative for even a 10 day window.  Figure 2 shows 
the CAR over a 16 day event window (from day -5 to day 10). 
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Figure 2: CAR from day -5 to day 10
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Figure 2: CAR over a 16 day event window 
 
Our result corroborates prior work on defective products (Jarrell et al 1985, Davidson et 
al 1992) by showing that product defects lead to a loss in market value of a firm. Our study 
analyzes returns on stocks of software vendors and we find that a defective software which 
compromises the security of customers’ information systems leads to a negative impact on 
the market value of the software vendor.  The extent of losses suffered by a vendor, on 
average, is moderate at about 0.63% of its market capitalization value on the day the 
vulnerability gets announced. 
Market Capitalization 
We also calculated the abnormal change in market capitalization values of the software 
vendor due to the vulnerability announcement14. For each firm, the day 0 change in market 
capitalization value was calculated by multiplying the day -1 market capitalization value 
with the abnormal returns on day 0. On average, we calculate that the software vendors in 
our sample lost $0.86 billion in market capitalization value on the day of the vulnerability 
disclosure.  Since Microsoft accounts for more than 40% of our sample, we sub-divide our 
sample into Microsoft and non-Microsoft samples. For the Microsoft sample, the average 
                                                 
14 We obtain the market capitalization values from the CSRP database by multiplying the share price with the 
number of shares outstanding. 
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change in market capitalization is around $0.92 billion and for the non-Microsoft sample, 
the average change in market value is $0.81billion.  
Robustness Checks: We also perform the following robustness checks on our results, as 
specified in the event study by Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau (2001).  
1. Robustness to Outliers: 
To check the robustness of our results to exclude the effect of outliers, we compute the 
CAR for our sample after excluding the top 10 percentile and the bottom 10 percentile of 
observations (ranked according to the day 0 mean abnormal returns). We find that our 
results remain qualitatively the same. For example, mean abnormal returns for this sample 
are 0.53% (against 0.63% for the entire sample) and these are significant at the 5% level.  
This suggests that our results are robust to outliers in the data. 
2. Momentum Effect:  
It can be argued that the day 0 abnormal returns are caused simply by market momentum 
than by the underlying event. As a simple check, we compute the correlation between the 
abnormal returns before the event and those after the event. In specific, we check the pair-
wise correlation (along with level of significance) for three pairs of values : one, day -10 to 
day -1 CAR and day 0 to day 10 CAR; two, day -10 to day -1 CAR and day 0 CAR; and 
three, day -1 CAR and day 0 CAR. The pair-wise correlations are as follows:  
• day -10 to day -1 CAR and day 0 to day 10 CAR (correlation: 0.13, p-value 0.12) 
• day -10 to day -1 CAR and day 0 CAR (correlation: -0.05, p-value 0.5) 
• day -1 CAR and day 0 CAR (correlation: 0.03, p-value 0.67) 
Thus we find that none of the correlations is strong or significant at the 10% level and 
hence the momentum in the stock prices does not seem to be driving our results. 
5. Regression Analysis 
To test the other hypothesis, we develop both a regression model and simple means test 
to explain the effect of various vulnerability characteristics on abnormal returns. However, 
ordinary least squares model might not be appropriate because it does not account for 
heterogeneity among firms. The issue of heterogeneity is an important consideration in 
analyzing panel data. For example, the level of abnormal returns could differ across firms 
if investors use different valuation models across firms (Malatesta and Thompson 1985). 
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Estimating aggregate parameters while ignoring heterogeneity could lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Hsiao 1986). 
To incorporate the impact of firm specific heterogeneity in our data, we propose a fixed 
effects model. The fixed effects model controls for unobservable firm specific variables 
that are constant over time. This is equivalent to generating dummy variables for each firm 
and including them in an ordinary linear regression to control for firm specific effects. The 
fixed effects model can be specified as: 
itiitit Xy εµβ ++⋅=                  (5) 
where i = 1…..N (N is the total number of firms) and t = 1……..T (T is the total number 
of events). yit is the Abnormal Return (ARit) for firm i at event t as calculated according to 
the market model in equation (1)15. Xit are the independent variables which capture the 
various vulnerability characteristics, ui is the firm specific dummy variable. The 
description of the independent variables is as follows: 
SEVR: whether the vulnerability has been classified as severe; SEVR = 1 for a severe 
vulnerability and 0 otherwise.  
PATCH: Whether a patch is available at the time of the vulnerability disclosure. PATCH 
=1 if a patch is available and 0 otherwise.  
DISC: Whether the vulnerability was disclosed by the third party. DISC = 1 if the 
vulnerability was disclosed by the third party and 0 if disclosed by the vendor.  
EXPLOIT: If an exploit is publicly available at the time of the vulnerability 
announcement, then EXPLOIT = 1; otherwise it is zero. 
CERT: If the vulnerability was first reported in CERT, then CERT = 1, it is 0 otherwise.  
PRESS: If the vulnerability was first reported in popular press, the variable PRESS = 1, 
otherwise it is zero.16  
DOS: If the vulnerability can potentially lead to a denial of service type attack or a 
disruption in services, then the variable DOS =1, otherwise it is zero. 
Effect of Investor Sentiments:  
                                                 
15 Since the market model is the most common model used in event studies, we proceed with the remaining 
analysis with this model. 
16 For PRESS and CERT, we compare with the baseline case that the vulnerability was reported at the 
CNET/ZDNET owned news.com website. 
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To control for abnormal returns due to overall market sentiments, we introduce a set of 
dummy variables based on the time when the vulnerability was announced. We use the 
events surrounding 9/11 as the basis for segmenting our sample into various time periods. 
The stock market crash in late 2000 could also play a role in the negative abnormal returns. 
We introduce the following dummy variables in our model: 
Post_911: If the vulnerability was announced within a year of 9/11, i.e. if the date of 
the announcement was between Sept 11, 2001 and Sept, 11 2002. This constitutes 19 
observations from our sample. 
Pre_911: If the vulnerability was announced within a year before 9/11, i.e. if the date of 
the announcement was between Sept 11, 2000 and Sept, 11 2001. This was also the time 
after the stock market crashed in mid 2000 and lasted till the first three quarters of 2001 
(Wall Street Journal, 200017, Kannan et al 2003, Wall Street Journal, 200318). This 
constitutes 28 observations from our sample. 
Year_99-00: if the announcement was made prior to September 11, 2000, i.e. if the date 
of the announcement is between Jan 1, 1999 and September 11, 2000.  This constitutes 23 
observations from our sample.  
Year_02-03: If the date of the announcement is between September 11, 2002 and 
September 11, 2003. This constitutes 44 observations from our sample. 
Year_03-04: If the date of the announcement is between September 11, 2003 and June 
1, 2004. This constitutes 32 observations from our sample. This is the baseline category for 
our regression. 
5.1 Results 
We first compare the mean CARs of different sub samples based on vulnerability 
characteristics to understand how various factors affect market value of the firms. The 
characteristics that we consider are explained above. This is similar to the method followed 
by Subramani and Walden (2001), Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud (2001) Im, Dow and 
Grover (2001). The results are summarized in Table 5. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Article titled ‘The Internet Bubble Broke Records, Rules and Bank Accounts’ dated 07/14/2000 
18 Article titled ‘Thinking Things Over: On Repairing Economic Damage’ dated 03/10/2003 
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Table 5: Means Test 
Vulnerability 
Characteristic 
Variable CAR p-value 
High Severity (81%) -0.76 0.015  
Severity Low Severity (19%) -0.04 0.04 
Discovered by Vendor 
(36%) 
-0.95 0.1  
Source of Discovery Discovered by Third 
Party (64%) 
-0.47 0.2 
Patch Available (24%) -0.37 0.28  
Patch Availability Patch Not Available (76%) -1.49 0.05 
CERT (34%) -0.47 0.4 
Press (35%) -0.98 0.04 
 
Source of Disclosure 
News.com (30%) -0.47 0.3 
Denial of Service (24%) -0.23 -0.66  
Type of Attack Possible Confidentiality (76%) -0.78 0.015 
Microsoft (46%) -0.28 0.4  
Microsoft vs Non 
Microsoft 
Non Microsoft (54%) -0.91 0.13 
 
From the means analysis it is clear that more severe vulnerabilities affect the stock price 
more. Surprisingly, when vendors disclose the information then the investors seem to 
perceives it more negatively than when some third party releases it. As expected, 
availability of patch mitigates the negative impact of disclosure somewhat. Since the 
vendors typically disclose the information with a patch, we may find during the 
multivariate regression that vendor release effect may disappear. The source of disclosure 
is also relevant. Investors seem to pay more attention to vulnerabilities published in 
mainstream newspapers than to CERT. Confidentially breaches are considered more severe 
and hence have higher significant impact than denial of service vulnerabilities. Finally, we 
do not find an evidence of Microsoft effect though, non-Microsoft firms seem to lose more 
value.   
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In the second method, we test our hypothesis related to the impact of various 
vulnerability characteristics on the market value of a software vendor using the 
multivariate regression model outlined in equation (5). This is similar to the methodology 
followed by prior event studies such as Hendricks and Singhal (1997), Chatterjee, 
Richardson and Zmud (2001), Lane and Robertson (1995). The regression method has the 
advantage over the sub-sample method used in Table 5 that the regression method captures 
the effect of all the independent variables simultaneously. The sub-sample method could 
give spurious results because the effects of a sub-sample, such as patch vs no-patch, can be 
explained by a relationship between patch and other independent variables. The parameter 
estimates as well as the p-values for the various parameters of our fixed effects regression 
are given in the Table 6 below. 
Table 6 : Regression Estimates 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
SEVR -0.006* 0.1 
EXPLOIT -0.005 0.24 
PATCH 0.0083* 0.04 
DISC -0.005 0.16 
CERT 0.006 0.3 
PRESS -0.0053 0.27 
DOS 0.0076* 0.06 
Y_99-00 -0.007 0.26 
Pre_911 -0.011* 0.05 
Post_911 -0.02* 0.001 
Y_02-03 -0.01* 0.05 
Constant 0.01* 0.05 
 
The R2 for this regression is 16.6%. The F-test (p-value 0.001) for the overall model 
suggests that our model is highly significant. The constant in the regression is simply the 
average of all the fixed effects in the model. Our regression provides several interesting 
observations regarding the effect of the vulnerability characteristics on the stock price of 
the vendor. 
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1. Severity: The coefficient on the SEVR variable in Table 6 is negative and significant 
(though at p = 0.1). This is consistent with results in Table 5. More severe 
vulnerabilities have a higher potential to cause damage and hence have a larger adverse 
impact on CAR. On average, a severe vulnerability can cost a software vendor 0.6% 
more than a non-severe vulnerability, providing support to hypothesis H4.  
2. Patch: We also find that the non-availability of a patch is positive and significantly 
correlated with the market value. This provides support to hypothesis H2 because the 
coefficient on the PATCH variable suggests that on average, firms which do not 
provide a patch at the time of the vulnerability disclosure suffer a loss of 0.83% more 
than firms which provide a patch.  
3. Confidentiality: The coefficient of the DOS variable is 0.0076. This implies that 
vulnerabilities which result in a non-confidential breach (denial of service, disruptions 
in service) have an abnormal return of 0.76% higher than the vulnerabilities which 
result in a confidentiality-related breach. This confirms our hypothesis H3.  
None of the other coefficients are significant (except time coefficients). Thus our results 
fail to provide support for hypothesis H5 and H6. From table 5 also, we can observe that 
none of the sub-samples (other than the Press sub-sample) has a significant coefficient. 
The rejection of hypothesis H5 is especially interesting because it suggests that the markets 
do not penalize a vendor any more if the vulnerability is discovered by a third party than 
by the vendor itself.  
We also control for the effect of the time period during which the vulnerabilities were 
announced to control for time-specific investor sentiments which can affect abnormal 
returns. We find that software vendors suffered the greatest abnormal returns in the one 
year period post 9/11; for example, on average, vendors lost 2% more in market value for 
each vulnerability announcement in the year following 9/11 than they did in the baseline 
period (2003-04). This suggests that security concerns among investors were highest 
during this period, as an aftermath of September 11. The next highest period of abnormal 
returns was the one-year time frame after the dot-com crash, i.e. from Sept 2000 to Sept 
2001. In this period, software vendors lost, on average, 1.0% more on vulnerability 
announcements than in the baseline period. The results also suggest that year 2003-04 is 
when the vendors suffered the least. It is possible that vulnerability announcements have 
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become commonplace and are not affecting the vendors as much. But, more research is 
needed to provide a definitive answer. 
6. Conclusions and Discussion  
     To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the impact of product 
defects on software vendors. We also analyze the information content of the vulnerability 
disclosure announcement and classify vulnerabilities into various sub-types based on the 
following characteristics: the source of vulnerability disclosure, severity of the 
vulnerability, availability of a fix, whether an exploit was publicly available at the time of 
discovery, the type of security breach caused by the vulnerability and the source of 
vulnerability discovery. Our results show that vulnerability disclosure leads to a significant 
loss of market value for software vendors. This indicates that the stock markets react 
negatively to the news of a vulnerability disclosure, because the discovery of a 
vulnerability could suggest a loss in future cash flow of the software vendors. Software 
vulnerabilities affect the cash flows of a vendor in two main ways: One, the vendor has to 
spend time and effort in providing a patch for the vulnerability, which increases the overall 
cost of the software product and hence reduces profits. Vulnerabilities may also lead to 
customer dissatisfaction because the customer has to spend time and effort in installing 
patches and is exposed to a risk of security related attacks. This could further lead to 
customers shifting to competitor’s products and hence reduces the cash flow for the 
vendors’ products. This has implications for software vendors to invest in improving the 
quality of their software. While vendors would like to launch software products as soon as 
possible, our study shows that vendors need to focus testing in areas that can potentially 
contain greater number of security vulnerabilities. We also show that the effect of a 
vulnerability announcement is quickly incorporated into the stock price and after the 
second day, there is no significant impact on the stock prices. We check for the robustness 
of our results in terms of checking for outliers and checking for momentum effects in the 
stock returns. We find that our results are also robust to the effect of investor sentiments 
since we control for the effect of various time periods in our regression.  
Our study also provides preliminary evidence that firms should integrate security into 
software quality practices. In a firm with limited resources, this would mean focusing 
testing efforts in areas that have a greater number of security vulnerabilities. Although 
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researchers in computer science have stressed on this fact (McGraw 2004), there hardly 
exists any literature in software engineering economics which measures the return on 
investment of incorporating security based metrics in software quality or software risk 
assessment. While software quality traditionally deals with functional testing, complete 
security testing would incorporate non-functional testing we well, i.e. subjecting the 
software to misspecified input streams (Potter and McGraw 2004).  
Our results also show that vulnerabilities which are severe or which can cause a 
confidentiality related attack are likely to result in a greater loss in market value for a 
vendor. This has implications for the software vendor in terms of allocating resources for 
software testing and quality improvements. For example, vendors should focus on 
spending more resources in testing those software modules where a flaw is more likely to 
cause a confidentiality related breach. Campbell et al (2003) show that confidentiality 
related breaches cause a greater loss to firms; we complement that result by showing that 
software vulnerabilities which cause a confidentiality related breach are likely to result in a 
greater loss in market value for the vendor. 
Comparison with prior event studies: 
It is interesting to compare how the abnormal returns in our event study compare with 
results in prior event studies. Specifically, we compare our results with event studies in the 
following categories: security breach related announcements, IT investment related 
announcements and product defect related announcements.  
Table-7 shows that our results are comparable to prior studies on product defects and 
product recall announcements. It is especially interesting to note that the loss in market 
value that vendors suffer due to a security vulnerability is much less than that suffered by 
firms during a security breach. A possible reason could be that software vendors are 
protected by click-wrap agreements and have only limited liability for any flaw in their 
products. Another reason is that firms usually supply a patch with the vulnerability 
disclosure (almost 76% of observations in our sample have a patch available at the time of 
disclosure). Therefore security breaches are not so much caused due to unprotected 
vulnerabilities as due to lack of adequate patching done by firms. E.g. the SQL Slammer 
virus, which affected millions of servers worldwide, was created when hackers exploited a 
six month old vulnerability in SQL. Microsoft had already released a patch for the same, 
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but, as demonstrated by the Slammer, many firms had not adequately protected their 
servers by applying the patch. 
Table 7: Summary of previous event studies 
Classification of Event 
Study 
Authors Time 
Period 
CAR 
Impact of Vulnerability 
Disclosures on 
Software Vendors 
Telang R and S Wattal (2004) 1999-2004 -0.63% 
Campbell K, Gordon LA, Loeb MP 
and L Zhou (2003) 
1995-2000 -2.0%* 
 
Cavusoglu H, Mishra B and S 
Raghunathan (2004) 
1998-2000 -2.1% 
Hovav A and J D’Arcy (2003) 
 
1998-2002 Not 
Significant
 
Impact of Security 
Breaches on Firms 
Kannan K, Rees J and S Sridhar 
(2004) 
1997-2003 -0.73% 
Jarrell G and S Peltzman (1985) 
 
1967-1981 -0.81% 
 (for auto) 
 
Impact of Product 
Recall Announcements  
 
Davidson WL III and DL Worrell 
(1992) 
1968-1987 -0.36% 
(day -1) 
Chatterjee D, Richardson VJ and 
RW Zmud (2001) 
1987-1998 1.16% 
 
Im KS, Dow KE and V Grover 
(2001) 
1981-1996 Not 
Significant
Subramani M and E Walden (2001) Oct 1998- 
Dec 1998 
7.5% 
 
 
Impact of IT 
Investment 
Announcements 
Dos Santos BL, Peffers K and DC 
Mauer (1993) 
1981-1988 1% 
 
Impact of Winning a 
Quality Award 
 
 
Hendricks KB and Singhal VR 
(1996) 
1985-1991 0.59% 
* Not Significant at the 10% level 
Implications for Software Quality and Disclosure Policy 
 As we noted in introduction, one major argument given by the full disclosure group 
is that it will eventually force the vendors to improve the quality of their product. From our 
analysis, there seems to be some support for this argument. Disclosure, in general (with or 
without a patch) adversely affects the market valuation of the vendors. It is more severe in 
case of without patch (which is what generally happens during full disclosure). Thus, 
disclosure clearly creates some incentives for vendors to produce better quality software. 
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However, market value is only one metric to capture the impact of disclosure. A more 
interesting and comprehensive work would be to measure the impact of disclosure on 
profit or market share of these firms. But our paper does provide a starting point for why 
we should analyze this issue in more detail.  Another potential area of future research 
would be to capture and test the link between security based risks and the quality of 
software systems. 
 From our discussion, it is also clear why vendors are pushing for a limited 
disclosure policy. Recently, Organization for Internet Safety (OIS), which is consortia of 
11 large software vendors, announced a limited-disclosure policy which requires the 
discoverer to notify the vendors and give them some time before making the information 
public. From our analysis, such a policy benefits vendors because limited disclosure gives 
them time to release a patch for the vulnerability and availability of patch mitigates some 
adverse effects of disclosure.  We also find that whether the vulnerability is reported by 
vendors themselves, or other parties, it has essentially similar impact on market value. To 
an extent, our study points that vendors are not necessarily better off disclosing 
information themselves. Generally, an argument could be made that vendors should release 
the information themselves, for if not, someone else will and it will lead to worse 
consequences. However, we do not find any evidence of this. Vendors may be better off 
keeping quiet and integrate their fixes as either service packs (which do not give micro-
details on what it fixes) or newer versions and announce the patch only if someone else has 
disclosed it. However, more research is required; especially more data on announcements 
when hackers exploit the vulnerabilities.  
Another issue raised in discussing software flaws is whether software vendors should be 
held responsible by law for vulnerabilities discovered in their products. Currently, the use 
of End User License Agreements (EULA or Click-Wrap Agreements) that come with 
software products limit the liability that vendors face if customers suffer a loss due to a 
flaw in software. Our results show that liability laws (which anyway are not likely to pass 
sometimes soon) are not the only way to ‘punish’ software vendors for flaws discovered in 
their products. Market seems to act on this information and punishes a vendor, who on an 
average, loses around 0.63% of its market value on the day a vulnerability is reported in its 
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products. Software liability could certainly cause the market value of the vendors to 
decline further if a vulnerability is reported in their product.  
Some vulnerabilities are posted on a public listing such as Bugtraq before these are 
announced in popular press or CERT. In that case, the actual vulnerability announcement 
may have little surprise value. Therefore our results are a lower bound for the actual 
decrease in stock prices experienced by the software vendor if a flaw is reported in its 
product. We do not include the vulnerabilities reported on Bugtraq since most of these are 
not confirmed vulnerabilities at the time they are posted online.  
A limitation of our study is that most of the data points in our sample are 
announcements regarding off-the-shelf software products. Our analysis does not cover 
software development projects where a security flaw can cause millions of dollars worth of 
damage. The main reason for excluding them was the lack of availability of data on 
software failures in such cases.  We also reiterate that further analysis in terms of software 
quality, market share or profitability is needed to fully understand how vulnerability 
disclosure signals poorer quality and how it affects the vendors’ incentives to provide 
better quality software. Our paper takes the first step in this direction. 
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